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Abstract
Suppose an agency awards a …xed number of prizes to applicants in
di¤erent categories such that the applicant-to-winner ratio is constant by
category. It is demonstrated in a simple theoretical model that the number
of awards in a category will typically be positively related to the degree
of applicant uncertainty. The theoretical …ndings are related to awards
data from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
doctoral fellowship competition.
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Consider an agency charged with making scholarship awards. It may be di¢cult
to make comparisons between applicants in di¤erent disciplines. With a multi-
disciplinary selection committee, the number of winning applicants in a discipline
might depend less on applicant merit than upon the e¤orts of that discipline’s
committee representatives. One approach might be to allocate awards to di¤erent
committees organized by discipline and then let each discipline committee choose
the winners from that discipline’s applicants. This paper studies the implications
of such a solution if a committee’s share of awards is set equal to its share of ap-
plicants. As potential applicants will not apply without su¢cient probability of
winning, in plausible circumstances the number of applicants and hence the share
of awards will be a positive function of the uncertainty of assessment. Section 2
considers two special cases: the perfectcertainty case where every applicant knows
her own ability and the perfect uncertainty case, where the award is essentially
by lottery. Section 3 describes the more formal model under the assumption that
committees award entirely by perceived merit, states the main result as proved
in the Appendix, and speculates on its implication for an alternative mode of
committee behaviour. Section 4 discusses the Social Sciences and Humanities Re-
search Council of Canada doctoral fellowship competition in light of the model.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Two Special Cases
Begin by considering a discipline in which there is perfect certainty. Every indi-
vidual knows her ranking in the applicant pool of her discipline and the number of
awards in that discipline is a known fraction ¼ < :5 of the number of applicants,
with an integer value produced by conventional rounding. Given even a small
cost of application, no one will apply and no awards will be made. To see this,
suppose there are n students in a discipline. It can never be rational for the nth
ranked individual to apply. If she is the only one to apply, she cannot win be-
cause under the rounding rule there will be no awards with only one application.
If any combination of others apply, she is always beaten. Knowing that the nth
ranked individual will not apply, the (n¡1)st ranked individual will not apply as
well, realizing that she will either be the only applicant or lose as the last-ranked
2applicant. Following this logic to its conclusion, no one applies1 and no one wins.2
Now consider the case where no individual has information about her ranking.
Assuming the cost of application is su¢ciently low, all individualswill apply. This
result, in combination with the previous one, suggests that an increase in the
uncertainty of assessment will tend to increase the application rate, a conjecture
that is shown in the next section to hold under certain conditions.
3. The Model
3.1. Basic structure
We now turn to a model in which any randomly-selected individual in a particular
discipline has some imperfect information about how her application will compare
to others. We assume that, if she applies, the judging committee will grant her an
award if X + ¾Y ¸ S , where X (which we call “known ability”) is the publicly-
known component of her ability, ¾Y (which we call “measured ability”) is the
remaining component of the committee assessment that cannot be predicted by
the applicant and S is the known committee-set standard required to win. X and
Y are independent random variables with publicly-known density functions, the
latter with mean zero and variance one so that ¾ (the “measurement variance”)
1We can take this opportunity to relate our application to a more general literature. This
competition for an award is a tournament as in Lazear and Rosen (1981) with e¤ort a (0,1)
variable (not to apply or to apply). As in their model and in Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983), e¤ort
can be withdrawn as the uncertainty becomes small, because those with low ability are sure
losers and decide not to play (just as here). Unlike these papers, however, we will largely take
thedesign of the tournamentasgiven and willnot consider how applicationscould be stimulated
by providing “handicaps” to the less able.
The example also makes it clear how the participation of others can make it more likely an
individual should choose to participate, as in many games considered at a very general level by
Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
2Assuming that every potential applicant assumes that if it is in her interest to apply, it
will also be in the interest of all higher-ranked individuals to apply, it is possible to develop
other solutions for di¤erent values of ¼ and di¤erent rounding rules. The common element of all
solutions is that each applicant wins an award, for under perfect certainty it would be irrational
to apply and not win. If fractions are always rounded down, there will be no applicants for
¼ < 1. For conventional rounding (rounding to the closest integer with a number ending with .5
rounded to the higher integer), the number of applicants will be int[:5=(1¡¼)] where int[x] is
the largest integer in the closed interval [0;x]. For rounding up, the number of applicants will
be int(1=(1¡ ¼)) where int(x) is the largest integer in the open interval (0;x). Under the last
solution, there will always be at least one applicant for ¼ > 0.
3is a publicly-known indicator of applicant uncertainty.3 We further assume that
any individual will apply if
Prob(X +¾Y ¸ S j X) ¸ ®; (3.1)
where probability ® isthe same acrossindividualsand re‡ects the costofapplying.
That is, the individual will apply if, given her known ability, the probability that
her total ability will attain the winning standard is su¢cient to o¤set the cost of
applying.
If we assume that individuals are identical (and are treated identically by the
committee) except for X and Y , then there will be some level of known ability E
such that all individuals with X ¸ E will apply. Hence
Prob(E +¾Y ¸ S) = ® (3.2)
or
FY ((S ¡E)=¾) = 1¡® (3.3)
where FY is the (monotonic) cumulative probability distribution of Y . Hence
E = S ¡¾a; (3.4)
where a = F
¡1
Y (1 ¡®).
Turning to the behavior of the judging committee, we assume the committee
sets the standard S such that a fraction ¼ of a large pool of applicants would win,
that is, that a random draw from the applicant pool will have merit in excess of
S with probability ¼:
¼ = Prob(X + ¾Y ¸ S j X ¸ E) (3.5)
We assume further that if it intends to reduce the proportion of successful
applicants, the committee must increase the standard S, that is
@¼=@S < 0: (3.6)
It does seem natural that if the standard is tightened, a smaller fraction of ap-
plicants will win. However, because the standard is publicly-known before ap-
plication, it is possible that increasing the standard will reduce the number of
3As a simple example, X could be based on transcript grades, where everyone agrees how a
transcriptcan bedistilled to asinglenumber. ¾Y could bethecomponent thecommittee assigns
to the new information in con…dential reference letters, conditional upon transcript grades.
4applicants so sharply that even though the number of winners is also reduced, the
result will be a higher proportion of winners. We discuss this assumption further
in the second theoremof Appendix A and …nd it follows from a necessary and suf-
…cient condition on the probability distribution of known ability X. We also …nd
a simpler su¢cient condition, namely that (3.6) follows if the probability distrib-
ution of known ability X has everywhere increasing hazard in the relevant range.
Many probability distribution functions, including the normal and the uniform,
meet this condition.
3.2. Main Result
Under the above conditions we prove in Appendix A our conjecture that
dE=d¾ < 0: (3.7)
That is, an increase in the measurement variance ¾ (uncertainty) will lower the
applicant threshold E and hence increase the number of applicants.
3.3. Computed Numerical Example
Figure 1 illustrates a computed numerical example where both X and Y are
standard normal, which implies that (3.6) is satis…ed. As the measurement er-
ror variance ¾ increases, the proportion of the population that applies increases
monotonically. Thisproportion also increaseswhen the win proportion ¼ increases
from .2 to .4 and decreases when the cost of applying increases as represented by
an increase in ®, the required win probability for the marginal applicant, from .05
to .1.
3.4. Alternative Committee Behavior
In our model there is an overall authority which gives each committee the right to
award a fraction ¼ awards to its (numerous) potential applicants: this could occur
for example if there were a large number of committees and the authority had a
…xed number of awards thatitallocated by number ofapplications, asdescribed in
the Introduction. Up to now we have assumed that the committee chose the best
applicants; we now point outthat it might choose not to do so if it were interested
in increasing the number of awards in its discipline. As an example, suppose the
committee decides to award a certain publicly-known fraction ! of the awards
5by lottery, with the goal of attracting more applicants and hence increasing the
discipline’s share of total awards.
The win probability of the marginal applicant ® now equals the sum of the
probability of the marginal applicant winning “on ability” and the probability of
being a “lucky loser” and winning by lottery:
® = (1¡FY (a)) + !¼(FY (a)) (3.8)







if !¼ is less than ®. If ! increases, a increases since ® and ¼ are constant. It can
be shown in the increasing hazard case that this will in turn imply a decrease in
E and an increase in the number of applicants. Figure 2 continues our normal
distribution example with ¾ = :5 and illustratesclearly howincreasesin ! increase
the proportion of potential applicants who enter.
It is perhaps especially interesting to consider the case where !¼ ¸ ®, as all
potential applicants then apply. Consider the ® = :01, ¼ = :2 case in Figure 2
where it can be seen that when ! is 0, about 25 per cent of potential applicants
enter. That means a fraction equal to about :25¼ = :05 or about 5 per cent of
potential applicants win. If ! is increased slightly to .05 (!¼ = :01 = ®), all
potential applicants will enter and hence 20 per cent of potential applicants win
(even though only one per cent of applicants will win via the lottery).4
4. SSHRC Doctoral Fellowship Competition
SSHRC doctoral fellowships are signi…cant stipends (currently $17,700 per year)
awarded to Ph.D. students in the social sciencesand humanities who are citizens or
Permanent Residents of Canada.
5 An award is normally renewed until the fourth
4An extension of this idea implies that if admission or editorial behavior has a capricious
element, universities or academic journals cannot necessarily be ranked in perceived quality by
using (the negative of) the admission or acceptance ratio.
5The Ontario Graduate Scholarship competition explicitly uses the method assumed in our
model to allocate awards by discipline but does not publish suitable data. The National Science
Foundation in the United States does not use this method but makes an institutional judgment
as to where to allocate both awards and research funds. Until recently, the Australian Research
Council awarded research funds by a method very similar to the one modelled here (see Fretz
and Veall, 2001).
6year of Ph.D. study. Applications consist of a form supplying academic history
and other basic information, grade information, a very brief proposal for doctoral
research and three academic reference letters. Before the 1995-96 competition,
applications were made by students directly to SSHRC and were judged by about
…fteen committees, each consisting of three to seven Canadian academics and
organized by discipline. Awards were divided among the committees essentially
as assumed in our model: each year the number of awards a committee could
make was equal to about 20 per cent of the number of applications directed to
that same committee.
A new system was introduced beginning with the 1995-96 competion. Ap-
plications are …rst judged at the university level (there is special provision for
applicants not currrently enrolled at a Canadian university) and each university
can only forward a given number to SSHRC for the second stage of judging. (The
quota for each university is largely a function of the previous success of that
university’s applicants.) At the second stage there are now only …ve commit-
tees: Arts and Letters, Humanities, Civilization and the Environment, Cognitive
Studies and Private and Public Policy Studies. The number of awards granted
within each of these …ve areas is close to proportional to the number of applicants
although there is some variation because each committee forwards some of its
nonwinning applications for further consideration by a single supercomittee that
makes further awards.
SSHRC publishes the number of applications and awards by discipline, al-
though the discipline categories do change somewhat over time. We also need an
estimate of the size of the potential applicant pool. We have obtained Statistics
Canada data for the number of nonvisa full-time Ph.D. students by discipline.6
However we need the numbers of Ph.D. students in the …rst four years of study
(as more senior students are not eligible) and such data are not available.7 Given
that time to completion/withdrawal varies sharply across disciplines we decided
to estimate (admittedly crudely) the number in the …rst four years using Ontario
6This excludes those Permanent Residents of Canada who can apply (provided they have
a degree from a Canadian university) even though they are at a foreign university or are not
currently at any university (respectively 9% and 8% of applications in 2001). There is no good
way to estimate discipline categories for this part of the applicant pool. By leaving it out,
our comparisons of relative application rates across disciplines will be misleading to the extent
students in di¤erent disciplines apply di¤erentially from these other streams.
7Strictly speaking, the applicant pool consists of those who would be in their …rst four years
of Ph.D. study in the following year when any award would apply. However taking the number
of those currently in their …rst four years of Ph.D. studies seems a reasonable approximation.
7Council of Graduate Studies (OCGS) data on entry/enrolment ratios by disci-
pline. Appendix B describes this “four-year” adjustment as well as other aspects
of the data, including the matches between SSHRC, Statistics Canada and OCGS
categories that we used. Appendix B also includes results without the four-year
adjustment.
Table 1 describes the data using 1990-1994 averages. The estimated number
of eligible students in the …rst column is clearly imperfect: note for example that
in the small categories Law and Classical Studies, the number of students who
applied for SSHRC awardsexceed our estimate of the numberof eligible students.8
We also note that the estimated number of eligible students in Geography and
Psychology is misleadingly high because many students in these disciplines are
ruled to be in natural rather than social sciences and are eligible for another
fellowship program and not the SSHRC program. Finally, it might be argued
that Education is a special case because most doctoral students in Education in
Canada are at a few programs (the largest number at the Ontario Institute for
Studiesin Education)thatattractasigni…cantportion ofpost-careerorlate-career
students, some of whom are educational practitioners as opposed to researchers.
While we include Classical Studies, Law, Geography, Psychology and Education
in our tables for completeness, we classify them as outliers and omit them from
further discussion.
Turning more closely to Table 1, note that the application success rate (mea-
sured as the average number of winners divided by the average number of applica-
tions) does not vary much by discipline, ranging between 0.18 and 0.22 except for
Anthropology/Archaelogy. There is however substantial variation in the applica-
tion rate, even in disciplines with relatively clear boundaries. Note for example
that while an estimated 34 per cent of eligible students in Management /Business
Administration studies applied and an estimated 41 percentof eligible students in
Economics applied, the comparable …gures in History, Anthropology/Archaelogy
and Fine Arts are 75, 75 and 82 per cent respectively. The di¤erence in applica-
tion rates is re‡ected in the win rate (the average number of winners divided by
the average estimated number of eligible students). Categories are ordered by win
rates and it can be seen that this ordering re‡ects the di¤erences in application
8In the case of Law, until 2001 SSHRC permitted students pursuing a Master’s degree to
apply, provided they could demonstrate an intention topursuean academiccareer. In the case of
Classical Studies, the discrepancy is probably due to a mismatch between the Statistics Canada
and SSHRC categorizations, as some students registered in other disciplines (e.g. History or
Archaelogy) apply in Classical Studies.
8rates: for example Fine Arts has a win rate more than double that of Economics.
It has an estimated 27 per cent fewer eligible students but averaged 32 awards
compared to just 20 in Economics. It might be argued that Economics and Man-
agement/ Business Administration are the most quantitative of the disciplines in
the social sciences and humanities and hence their applicants have the best notion
of how their abilities are perceived (i.e. ¾ is small). The relatively low application
rates and win rates in these disciplines are therefore consistent with our model.
9
There is a similar pattern in Table 2 which uses 1995-2001 data. While ap-
plication success rates vary more than in the previous table, still it is obvious
that in most cases a discipline’s share of the awards depends largely on its ap-
plication rate. Again Economics and Management/Business Administration have
the lowest application and win rates, not counting disciplines we have classed as
outliers.10 We also note from Table 2 how much lower the application rates are
in this second period as compared to the …rst period. We argue that this is con-
sistent with our model: as described above from 1995 on, some applications (in
practice 40% to 50%) were culled at the university level. Applicants who were
removed from consideration at this stage were informed and hence became more
aware of their perceived ability. In terms of our model, ¾ was reduced and hence
the number of applications fell.
11
9Anglin and Meng (2000) …nd that for …rst-year undergraduate classes in Ontario, grade
variance in Economics is much higher than that in English, French, Philosophy, Political Science
and Sociology, and moderately higher than in Psychology, although …rst-year undergraduate
courses may not re‡ect marking practices at higher levels. Higher variation in grades could be
associated with less uncertainty in one’s perceived ability.
10A rival explanation is that Economics and Management/Business Administration students
have a higher opportunity cost of time, perhaps because of better employment prospects. While
we are not sure that the time required to write an application is so large as to make this expla-
nation plausible, we cannot rule this possibility out. Neither can we rule out the “explanation”
of discipline “culture”. Regardless, our tables do show a strong association between applicant
behaviour and the eventual allocation of awards. This result is of particular interest to those
of us in Economics departments as not only does the result of current practice seem to be a
low share for Economics but also the share has fallen recently, with only 7 doctoral awards in
Economics in 2000-2001. Dixon and Rosson (undated) argue based on related data thatstudents
and faculty in business schools are receiving an inappropriately small portion of SSHRC student
and research support.
11Unadjusted and adjusted enrolment increased in virtually all disciplines over this period,
sometimes substantially. The number of applications fell in 12 of our 17 categories. This fall
in application rates (which has led to a small increase in application success rates) is not easily
explained by the opportunity cost explanation mentioned in the previous footnote.
95. Conclusions
We have presented a model of scholarship application and allocation in which
an increase in an applicant’s uncertainty about how her abilities will be judged
may, under certain conditions, induce more individuals to apply. One reason this
may be important is if the number of scholarships in a program or discipline are
directly linked to the number of applications. While our examination of data for
awards by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is far
from conclusive, we do present some …ndings which are consistentwith our model,
such as an apparent tendency for students in Fine Arts (whose performance may
be di¢cult to measure) to apply more for awards than other students. The model
suggests that committees interested in generating more applications, perhaps in
the interest of gaining applicant share relative to other committees in the same
program, may have an incentive to make some awards capriciously, such as by
lottery.
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11Table 1
SSHRC Doctoral Fellowships by Discipline: Estimated Number of
Eligible Students, Actual Number of Applicants and Winners,
Annual Averages, 1990-1994
Est. # # # Success Applic. #Win/
Discipline Eligible Apply Win Rate Rate #Enroll
(A) (B) (C) (C)¥(B) (B)¥(A) (C)¥(A)
Law 43 72 15 0.20 1.67 0.35
Classical Studies 33 39 9 0.22 1.18 0.27
Fine Arts 180 148 32 0.22 0.82 0.18
Anthro./Archaelogy 176 132 30 0.23 0.75 0.17
History 408 301 63 0.21 0.75 0.15
Linguistics 109 69 15 0.22 0.63 0.14
Commun./Media Studies 68 48 9 0.20 0.71 0.13
Political Science 377 237 49 0.21 0.63 0.13
Religious Studies 164 116 21 0.18 0.71 0.13
Philosophy 300 165 34 0.21 0.55 0.11
Sociology 323 169 35 0.21 0.52 0.11
Modern Lang./Lit. 980 476 96 0.20 0.49 0.10
Economics 248 102 20 0.20 0.41 0.08
Mgmt./ Bus. Admin. 361 127 28 0.22 0.34 0.08
Psychology 991 333 66 0.20 0.34 0.07
Geography 249 83 15 0.18 0.33 0.06
Education 1382 258 50 0.19 0.19 0.04
Total (ex. Education) 5008 2616 538 0.21 0.52 0.11
Total (inc. Education) 6390 2873 588 0.20 0.45 0.09
Categories are ranked bydescending#Win/#Enroll values(lastcolumn). Val-
ues in the …rst three columnshave been rounded to the nearestinteger. Categories
with an annual average of fewerthan 25 applications have been omitted and totals
re‡ect those omissions. See Appendix B for notes regarding underlying data.
12Table 2
SSHRC Doctoral Fellowships by Discipline: Estimated Number of
Eligible Students, Actual Number of Applicants and Winners,
Annual Averages, 1995-2001
Est. # # # Success Application #Win/
Discipline Eligible Apply Win Rate Rate #Enroll
(A) (B) (C) (C)¥(B) (B)¥(A) (C)¥(A)
Classical Studies 39 34 7 0.21 0.85 0.18
Anthro./Archaelogy 281 162 39 0.24 0.57 0.14
Law 126 64 16 0.25 0.51 0.13
Fine Arts 243 140 30 0.21 0.57 0.12
History 466 268 55 0.20 0.57 0.12
Philosophy 317 186 36 0.19 0.59 0.11
Commun./Media Studies 98 45 9 0.19 0.46 0.09
Political Science 424 214 39 0.18 0.51 0.09
Modern Lang./Lit. 1023 452 86 0.19 0.44 0.08
Linguistics 179 59 14 0.24 0.33 0.08
Sociology 426 165 31 0.19 0.39 0.07
Psychology 1242 365 77 0.21 0.29 0.06
Religious Studies 238 89 13 0.15 0.38 0.05
Geography 440 102 23 0.22 0.23 0.05
Economics 295 71 14 0.20 0.24 0.05
Mgmt./Business Admin. 462 96 16 0.16 0.21 0.03
Education 1679 261 40 0.15 0.16 0.02
Total (ex. Education) 6300 2512 505 0.20 0.40 0.08
Total (inc. Education) 7979 2773 544 0.20 0.35 0.07
NotestoTable 1 apply. In addition note that average enrolment dataare based
on the 1995 to 1998 period, as more recent data adjusted for residence status in
Canada are not available.
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Theorem 0.1. Using the notation and conditions given in the text, dE=d¾ < 0
(that is an increase in applicant uncertainty will reduce the application threshold
and hence increase the number of applications).
Proof. Begin by substituting (3.4) into (3.5) to obtain
¼ = Prob(X +¾(Y ¡a) ¸ E j X ¸ E)
=
Prob(X + ¾(Y ¡a) ¸ E and X ¸ E)
Prob(X ¸ E)
=
Prob(X +¾(Y ¡a) ¸ E and X ¸ E and Y ¸ a)
Prob(X ¸ E)
+
Prob(X + ¾(Y ¡a) ¸ E and Y < a)
Prob(X ¸ E)
=
Prob(X ¸ E and Y ¸ a) + Prob(X + ¾(Y ¡a) ¸ E and Y < a)
Prob(X ¸ E)
and since independence implies that
Prob(X ¸ E and Y ¸ a) = Prob(X ¸ E) ¢ Prob(Y ¸ ®) = ® ¢ Prob(X ¸ E),
therefore
¼ = ® +
Prob(X +¾(Y ¡a) ¸ E and Y < a)
Prob(X ¸ E)
(0.1)
Note in passing that the implication that ® must be less than or equal to ¼
makes intuitive sense. Because ¼ is the probability of winning for a randomly
chosen applicant, it cannot be less than the probability of winning of the marginal
applicant.
Now rewrite (0.1) as ¼ = ¼(E;¾) and di¤erentiate totally (with a and ® …xed):
d¼ = (@¼=@E)dE +(@¼=@¾)d¾
Setting d¼ = 0 and rearranging we obtain:
dE=d¾ = ¡(@¼=@¾) = (@¼=@E) (0.2)
By (3.4), @¼=@E = @¼=@S which by assumption (3.6) is less than zero. (We will
examine this assumption in the second theorem below.) Hence the sign of (0.2)
will be the sign of @¼=@¾.
16To sign @¼=@¾, begin by noting that (0.1) suggests a partition of (X;Y ) space
using the three lines:
X + ¾(Y ¡a) = E () Y = a + (E ¡X)=¾ () Y = (S ¡X)=¾ (0.3)
X = E (0.4)
Y = a (0.5)
(0.3) is the line corresponding to the committee’s awarding rule: they award
a scholarship if the sum of the known ability and the measured ability meets
their standard S, that is if X + ¾Y ¸ S. (0.4) is the line corresponding to the
individual’s decision rule: all individuals with X ¸ E will apply. (0.5) is the
level of normalized measured ability Y that the marginal applicant (with X = E)
must have in order to win (and hence all applicants with that level of normalized
measured ability will win).
Figure A1illustratesthese linesin (X; Y )space. A, B and C are the probabilities
that the realizations (X;Y ) will lie in the areas delineated by these lines. A is the
probability that an applicant would have measured ability greater than a (and
hence win) while B is the probability that an applicant will have measured ability
below a but win anyway because of high known ability X. C is the probability
that an applicant will not win. Hence the probability of an applicant winning is
¼ = (A+B)=(A+B+C) and the minimum probability for an applicant to apply
is ® = 1¡FY (a) = A=(A+B +C) where FY is the cumulative distribution func-
tion of Y (and fY is the density function and FX and fX are the corresponding
functions for the independent random variable X). The last equality follows from
the independence of X and Y .
Hence we can rewrite (0.1) as:
¼ = ® +
B
A +B + C
(0.6)





as a and A+B+C = Prob(X ¸ E) are not functions of ¾. But from the diagram
it can be seen that @B=@¾ must be negative as an increase in ¾ induces a coun-
terclockwise rotation of line (0.3) around the point (E;a) which must necessarily
17reduce probability B. Signing @B=@¾ formally,
B = Prob(X + ¾(Y ¡a) ¸ E and Y < a) (0.7)
= Prob(Y < a) ¢ Prob(X ¸ E + ¾(a ¡Y ) j Y < a)
= (1¡®) ¢Prob(X ¸ E + ¾(a ¡Y ) j Y < a)




fX(x)dx j Y < a]
where we have used the independence of X and Y and EY denotes the mathe-
matical expectation over the density of Y . Therefore
@B=@¾ = (1¡®) ¢ EY [¡(a ¡Y )fX(E + ¾(a ¡Y )) j Y < a] < 0
using Leibniz’s rule and the fact that the expectation of a random variable that
is always negative must also be negative. As discussed above this implies @¼=@¾
is negative and hence that dE=d¾ is also negative.
Theorem 0.2. Remove assumption (3.6) but otherwise maintain the same nota-
tions and conditions. Then if the hazard function of X is monotonic, dE=d¾ has
the opposite sign as the …rst derivative of the hazard function of X.
Proof. For convenience repeat
dE=d¾ = ¡(@¼=@¾) = (@¼=@E)
and note that the previous proof established that (@¼=@¾) < 0: Hence dE=d¾ will
have the same sign as @¼=@E which is no longer simply assumed to be negative.
Using (0.6)
@¼=@E =
(A+B +C)@B=@E ¡B ¢ @(A+B +C)=@E
(A+B +C)2 (0.8)
=
(A+B +C)@B=@E +B ¢ fX(E)
(A+B +C)2
where we have used the fact that @(A + B + C)=@E = ¡fX(E). To analyze
@B=@E, it will help to de…ne Z = ¾(a ¡ Y ) where Y < a and 0 otherwise, so
the density of Z is the density of ¾(a ¡ Y ) given Y < a. With this notation,
we can write the fourth line of (0.7) as B = (1 ¡ ®) ¢ EZ[1 ¡ FX(E + Z)] and
18hence @B=@E = (® ¡1) ¢ EZ[fX(E +Z)]. Therefore continuing from (0.8), using
A+B +C = 1¡FX(E):
@¼=@E =




(1¡FX(E))2(EZ[1¡FX(E +Z)]fX(E) ¡(1¡FX(E)) ¢ EZ[fX(E +Z)]
or
@¼=@E =
(1¡®)EZ[(1¡FX(E +Z))hX(E) ¡fX(E +Z)]
1¡FX(E)
=
(1¡®)EZ[(hX(E) ¡hX(E + Z))(1¡FX(E + Z))]
1¡FX(E)
where hX(E) = fX(E)=(1¡FX(E)) is the hazard function of X at X = E. The
sign of@¼=@E isthe sign ofthisexpectation which isthe sign ofhX(E)¡hX(E+Z)
if this term has the same sign for all Z > 0: Thus if hX(E) = hX(E + Z) for all
Z > 0, (A8) is zero. This is the case of constant hazard. If hX(E) < hX(E + Z)
for all Z > 0 (everywhere increasing hazard such as if fX is the normal density),
@¼=@E is negative and hence from above @E=@¾ is negative and an increase in
variance reduces the application threshold and hence increases the number of
applicants and the number of scholarships awarded. In the decreasing hazard
case where hX(E) > hX(E + Z) for all Z > 0, an increase in variance increases
the application threshold and reduces the number of applicants and the number
of scholarships awarded.
19Appendix B
The categories (whose titles we have sometimes abbreviated) are those used
by SSHRC in its current annual statistics (Table 7.6). We have omitted categories
with an annual average of fewer than 25 applications and combined Anthropol-
ogy and Archaelogy. We use the current SSHRC category titles for comparability
between Tables 1 and 2: there has been some renaming over time. Before 1997,
there were separate SSHRC categories for di¤erent kinds of literature (e.g. Amer-
ican Literature, English-Canadian Literature). These have been combined in the
Modern Languages and Literature category.
Most SSHRC categories had obvious counterparts in the Statistics Canada
enrolment data. Less obvious matches include Education (which we matched
to the total nonvisa Ph.D. enrolment in Statistics Canada categories Elementary-
Secondary TeacherTraining, HigherEducation, Human Kinetics, Education–Non-
Teaching Fields, Nursery and Kindergarten Education, Physical Education and
Recreology/Recreation Administration), Fine Arts (matched to Statistics Canada
categories Fine Arts, Music and Other Performing Arts), Linguistics (Linguistics
and Translation and Interpretation), Management, Business and Administrative
Studies (matched to Statisitics Canada categories Commerce, Management and
Business Administration and Specialized Administration Studies) and Modern
Languages and Literature (StatisticsCanadacategoriesEnglish, French and Other
Languages And/Or Other Literatures). SSHRC categories Geography and Urban,
Regional and Environmental Studies are combined as one category (“Geography”)
and matched with enrolment data for Geography and Man/Environment Studies.
As mentioned in the main text, the …elds of Geography and Psychology may have
signi…cant numbers of students applying for Natural Science and Engineering
Research Council of Canada postgraduate awards instead of SSHRCC doctoral
awards.
As noted in the text, the Statistics Canada enrolment data were obtained spe-
cially to exclude visa students (who are ineligible for SSHRC awards) but they
do not exclude students not eligible for SSHRC awards because they have been
in doctoral studies for more than four years. Suitable data are not available to
correct this shortcoming: we attempt a crude correction using Ontario Council
of Graduate Studies (OCGS) data on the ratio of incoming full-time students to
enrolled full-time students by discipline. (Call this the “OCGS ratio”.) After
constructing a Modern Languages and Literature category by adding together
Comparative Literature, English, German, Romance Languages and French (the
20last sometimes but not always separate from Romance Languages) and using An-
thropology as Anthropology/Archaelogy, there was a suitable OCGS ratio for all
categories except Communications and Media Studies: in that last case the aver-
age OCGS ratio was used. The estimated number of eligible doctoral students is
then taken as4£OCGS ratio£the number of students reported by SSHRC.
12 This
presumes a steady state in which full-time entrants stay 4 years after which they
begin to graduate/withdraw/switch to part-time status. Note that the number
“4” could be replaced by some other value and not a¤ect cross-discipline compar-
isons, except as noted in the footnote. Hence our approach could be recon…gured
as comparing number of applicants and winners per discipline annual entrant.
While we feel that the di¤erences in completion and withdrawal behaviour
across disciplines (that include students not eligible for SSHRC awards since they
have been in doctoral studiesmore than 4years) justify these admittedly crude ad-
justments, we provide the unadjusted data below in Tables A1 and A2. The rank-
ings are not that di¤erent: in particular Economics and Management/Business
Administration are still disciplines with low application and win rates and Fine
Arts and History are disciplines with high application and win rates.
12For both periods for Law, as noted in the text an outlier in any case and for 1990-94 for
Management/Business Administration, it was necessary to cap the estimate at total enrolment.
21Table A1
Enrolment of Fulltime Doctoral Students (Net of International Students) in Canadian
Universities and Number of SSHRCC Applicants and Winners, by Discipline,
Annual Averages, 1990-1994
# # # Success Application #Win/
Discipline Enroll Apply Win Rate Rate #Enroll
(A) (B) (C) (C)¥(B) (B)¥(A) (C)¥(A)
Law 43 72 15 0.20 1.68 0.34
Classical Studies 53 39 9 0.22 0.73 0.16
Fine Arts 213 148 32 0.22 0.70 0.15
Anthro./Archaelogy 201 132 30 0.23 0.66 0.15
Linguistics 114 69 15 0.22 0.60 0.13
Commun./Media Stud. 78 48 9 0.20 0.61 0.12
History 551 301 63 0.21 0.55 0.11
Political Science 446 237 49 0.21 0.53 0.11
Philosophy 348 165 34 0.21 0.47 0.10
Religious Studies 239 116 21 0.18 0.49 0.09
Sociology 416 169 35 0.21 0.41 0.08
Economics 252 102 20 0.20 0.41 0.08
Modern Lang./Lit. 1219 476 96 0.20 0.39 0.08
Mgmt., Bus.Admin. 361 127 28 0.22 0.35 0.08
Psychology 1292 333 66 0.20 0.26 0.05
Geography 316 83 15 0.18 0.26 0.05
Education 1462 258 50 0.19 0.18 0.03
Total (ex. Educ.) 6143 2616 538 0.21 0.43 0.09
Total (inc. Educ.) 7605 2873 588 0.20 0.38 0.08
Notes to Table 1 apply. As discussed in text, Table 1 uses an authors’ estimate
of enrollment by nonvisa Ph.D. students in their …rst four years of study. This
table uses actual enrollment data, all years of study included.
22Table A2
Enrolment of Fulltime Doctoral Students (Net of International Students) in Canadian
Universities and Number of SSHRCC Applicants and Winners, by Discipline,
Annual Averages, 1995-2001
# # # Success Application #Win/
Discipline Enroll Apply Win Rate Rate #Enroll
(A) (B) (C) (C)¥(B) (B)¥(A) (C)¥(A)
Classical Studies 51 34 7 0.21 0.66 0.14
Law 126 64 16 0.25 0.51 0.13
Anthro./Archaelogy 347 162 39 0.24 0.47 0.11
Fine Arts 319 140 30 0.21 0.44 0.09
History 726 268 55 0.20 0.37 0.08
Philosophy 481 186 36 0.19 0.39 0.07
Political Science 572 214 39 0.18 0.37 0.07
Communication/Media Stud. 134 45 9 0.19 0.33 0.07
Linguistics 218 59 14 0.24 0.27 0.06
Modern Lang./Lit. 1548 452 86 0.19 0.29 0.06
Sociology 641 165 31 0.19 0.26 0.05
Economics 314 71 14 0.20 0.22 0.04
Geography 550 102 23 0.22 0.19 0.04
Psychology 1881 365 77 0.21 0.19 0.04
Religious Studies 330 89 13 0.15 0.27 0.04
Mgmt., Bus. Admin. 530 96 16 0.16 0.18 0.03
Education 2503 261 40 0.15 0.10 0.02
Total (ex. Educ.) 8768 2512 505 0.20 0.29 0.06
Total (inc. Educ.) 11271 2773 544 0.20 0.25 0.05
Notes to Table A1 and Table 2 apply.
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